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On November 23rd, 2020, the CEOs of the eight largest Canadian pension funds—the socalled ‘Maple 8’—made a public pledge about their commitment to ‘creating more sustainable and
inclusive growth by integrating environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors into our
strategies and investment decisions.’ Arguing that this was not only the correct thing to do, they
also stated that [this] ‘is an integral part of our duty to contributors and beneficiaries [which] will
unlock opportunities […and] deliver long-term risk-adjusted returns’ (PSP 2020: 1). A similar
open letter was issued only six months earlier, in March 2020, by the then-leaders of three of the
world’s largest pension funds: the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), the
Japanese Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), and the largest UK pension fund, the
Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS). Here, the three giants outlined that ‘if we were to
focus purely on the short-term returns, we would be ignoring potentially catastrophic systemic
risks to our portfolio’ and underlined how ‘asset managers that only focus on short-term, explicitly
financial measures, and ignore longer-term sustainability-related risks and opportunities are not
attractive partners for us’ (GPIF 2020: 1).
These statements tell us that pension funds can have many good reasons to embrace a
sustainability lens in their investment practice, and that they are increasingly—and publicly—
willing to do so. A main driver of the move to embrace ESG in pensions is the inherent need for
long-term managers of corporate risks and opportunities to live up to their responsibilities as
intergenerational stewards of capital. Nevertheless, the particular structure of pension funds
creates both advantages and disadvantages for the adoption of sustainable finance practices and
the integration of ESG. While asset owners are often hailed as the ultimate enablers of a sustainable
transition on the financial market, 1 in many instances, pension funds do not live up to this
expectation. In particular, pension managers must consider how to include ESG given their
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primary mandate and fiduciary duty to secure long-term financial returns for their beneficiaries.
Accordingly, pension managers seeking to integrate ESG must operate within a web of pension
regulation, the legal interpretation of fiduciary duty, and the organizational characteristics of
pensions.
To analyze these institutional and organizational enablers and inhibiters of ESG integration
at pension funds, we employ the notion of ‘social origins’ (Eccles and Stroehle 2018; Eccles et al.
2019) in our review the historical and structural characteristics of the pension sector. Social origins
are defined as a combination of the historical and organizational origins of actors that condition
the social construction and use of often-vague concepts, such as ESG, within them. In our analysis,
we mostly focus on large public and private sector pension funds. By drawing on existing literature
and primary interview data, we seek to identify the characteristics and capabilities of these funds
that help or impede them in contributing to a larger sustainability agenda within their mandate. To
do so, we focus on three levels of analysis: the institutional level, which discusses historical and
regulatory embedded within the interpretation of fiduciary duty; the organizational level, which
reviews how investment mandates are translated into policies, governance structures, and
collaborations; and the portfolio level, which reviews investment strategies and asset allocation,
relationships with asset managers and pension funds’ stewardship activities. While drawing on the
larger literature about sustainability in pension funds, we focus our review on the pension systems
in Canada, the US and the UK. An in-depth case study of the Canadian Public Sector Pension
Investment Board (‘PSP Investments’ or ‘PSP’) supplements this structural comparison with more
detailed and practical insights.
Ultimately, our question is: what is it that makes these funds so well-positioned to drive a
wider integration of ESG, and why is this potential only partly being realized to date? Accordingly,
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our research seeks to draw attention to both the potential that pension funds have in disseminating
good practice in the wider investment community, and the inhibiting factors relevant to this
system.

Pensions in the 21st Century
A growing body of literature discusses how and why ESG is a potentially important source
of information for the investment decisions made by pension funds. Much of this debate frames
ESG as a tool that to help address the growing risks that have arisen globally, such as climate
change and income inequality, alongside the realization that sustainability-related system-level
challenges can and will have a material impact on market financial stability. The integration of
ESG factors in investment decision-making is then meant to hedge against this risk, while at the
same time being potentially able to identify companies with a higher growth and performance
potential (Bender et al. 2018).
To verify this, studies have reviewed the use of ESG in pensions’ asset allocation strategies
(Hawley and Lukomnik 2018; Alda 2019), their fiduciary duty and responsibility towards
beneficiaries (Bird and Gray 2013; Hoepner et al. 2011; Ambachtsheer and Bauer 2013), their
different schemes (Hoepner et al. 2011), and their investment horizons (Ambachtsheer 2014;
Kecskés et al. 2020). Since many pension funds manage their assets at least in part externally,
there is also a growing interest in how ESG features in pension funds’ mandates to their asset
managers (ICGN 2012). Furthermore, pensions’ relationship with sustainability is also considered
in broader debates such as the universal ownership thesis (Quigley 2019a 2019b; Urwin 2011;
Monks and Minow 2004), moral relativism (Eabrasu 2018), collective action (Gond and Piani
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2013; Woods 2011), the politicization of investors (Clark and Monk 2011) and in debates around
the tragedy of the commons (Kiernan 2007).
In parallel to the increasing importance of ESG, two important structural developments
have influenced the pension industry. Firstly, the size of pension funds has grown significantly
since the 1990s, correspondingly expanding the influence these funds have on the larger economy
(Johnson and De Graaf 2009). Secondly, many funds are transitioning from defined benefit (DB)
to defined contribution (DC) plans (Fabian et al. 2021). Both developments have important
implications for a potential integration of ESG.
The size of pension funds. According to a study of the Thinking Ahead Institute in 2020, 2 the
value of assets under management at the pension funds of the 22 major retirement countries were
on average equivalent to 62 percent of the GDP of their home countries. In Canada, the UK, and
the US, these numbers are even higher, with 90.5 percent, 108.7 percent and 85.8 percent
respectively in 2019, 3 highlighting just how important pension saving is in these markets.
Globally, pension funds are worth just over $50 trillion USD. In terms of equity holdings, pension
funds in the US held shares representing approximately 21 percent of the US equity market and 11
percent of global equities. Canadian and UK pension funds held shares equivalent to
approximately 19 percent and 8 percent of their national equity markets value. 4
Due to their size, pension funds have an important and expanding influence on the capital
markets (Johnson and de Graaf 2009), and are often described as the archetype of universal
ownership. This is particularly true for large public sector funds (Fabian et al. 2021). Universal
owners are commonly defined as large diversified institutional investors who have a long-term
investment horizon (Quigley 2019a). In the ESG debate, the notion postulates that these
institutions must take into account externalities, both across their (usually global) geographical
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portfolios, and in accordance with intergenerational equity (Urwin 2011). In line with this, Clark
and Monk note that pension funds, ‘by reason of their size, hold such significant stakes in the
market for traded securities that portfolio diversification is not an adequate means of risk
management’ (2010: 1731). Academics have therefore suggested that pensions take a systemslevel approach in investing (Hawley and Lukomnik 2018), to use their size for influence through
active (even activist) stewardship of companies (Quigley 2019b), and to make use of their
collective power in lobbying for change, both through the investment chain and at the policy level
(Gond and Piani 2013).
Transition from DB to DC. Over the last 30 years, a large majority of pension funds has shifted
away from the traditional DB model, which provided benefits based on workers’ salaries and
lengths of service, toward DC plans, where contributions are made to investment accounts and
funds are paid as benefits upon retirement (Fabian et al. 2021; Thurley and McInnes 2021). While
this shift has been more marked in the private, compared to the public, sector, the trend is likely
inexorable. This leads to concerns around the possibility of integrating ESG into retirement
systems, as most DC plans do not offer a sustainability fund. In the US, for example, only 2.8
percent of 401(k) plans in the US offered an ESG fund on their menus as of 2018 (Plan Sponsor
Council of America 2018). This is likely due to concerns about fiduciary duty and conflicting
regulatory policy, both of which led to confusion about the legality of pension products
incorporating ESG (Fabian et al. 2021). Since in practice, most plan participants tend to stick with
the fund into which they are defaulted when they join a plan, investment, the creation of an ESG
default option could be a useful place to start (The Pensions Regulator 2021). To date, however,
ESG default options are largely non-existent in DC plans.
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ESG Strategies and Outcomes at Pension Funds
When reviewing ESG strategies and outcomes, one needs to keep in mind that the ESG
concept and the underlying data are used in different ways. For instance, many believe that the
inclusion of ESG in investment decisions is critical for pension funds’ long-term risk management
and financial sustainability, yet there is no unique pathway by which this can be accomplished.
For instance, plans may distinguish between risk-focused use of ESG, financial value-seeking ESG
strategies, strategies based on normative principles, and those seeking positive social impact
(Eccles and Stroehle 2018; Giese et al. 2019). Many investors will use a combination of these
approaches; for instance, some could exclude morally sensitive sectors while at the same time elect
a long-term value-seeking strategy through ESG integration. Figure 1 provides an overview of the
range of choices that investors may confront when seeking to include ESG in their investment
decision making.
Figure 1 here
Because these strategies have fundamentally different motivations, their logic can be
contradictory. For example, exclusion is under heavy debate, because it has been proven to have
financial downsides (Atta-Darkua et al. 2020); at the same time, there is no real proof for its
effectiveness in pushing firms to act in a more sustainable manner (Kölbel et al. 2020). ESG
integration, on the other hand, seeks a financial upside—an objective that can be complemented
with a simultaneous exclusion strategy. Due to this, there is an increasing call to embrace
stewardship and engagement, instead of exclusion as a strategy. Engagement is argued to be a
more effective tool for creating behavioral changes at companies, therefore inducing both a
positive impact on the world and creating a financial upside (Broccardo et al. 2020; Blitz and
Swinkels 2020).
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Pension Origins and Key Characteristics for ESG Integration
Based on our literature review, numerous expert interviews we conducted (see the
appendix), and case studies, we next discuss pension fund characteristics which appear to be
particularly important for the adoption of ESG practices. The three levels on which we focus
include the institutional, organizational and portfolio levels. Figure 2 summarizes the elements
discussed.
Figure 2 here
The institutional level sets the legal boundaries to a pension fund’s ability to integrate ESG. This
ability stems from the historical origins of pension funds, their regulatory embeddedness, and the
interpretation of fiduciary duty by the regulator. Historically, pension funds have been heavily
influenced by social and political developments in their respective home countries, resulting in a
diverse landscape of national pension systems around the world (Hammond and O’Brien 2021).
The first pension system leads back to the German Empire in the late 19th Century, where
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck passed the Old Age and Disability Insurance Bill in 1889. In the
UK, the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908 was the first piece of legislation which awarded pensioners
age 70 or above a basic allowance (Filgueira and Manzi 2017). The motivation of these early
pension systems was driven by the Industrial Revolution and the growing importance of the
working classes, which required governments to alleviate old-age poverty in light of rising life
expectancies and failing familial support structures (Filgueira and Manzi 2017).
Much of today’s debates around the structure and purpose of pensions, however, have their
origins in the 1990s, when there was mounting uncertainty about the financial sustainability of the
‘Pay-As-You-Go’ public pension system in many of the OECD markets. As life expectancy rose

8
and seniors comprised a greater share of the population, this triggered a debate about the funding
of the pension plans as well as the move from DB to DC plans (Thurley and McInnes 2021).
Eduard van Gelderen, Senior Vice President and Chief Investment Officer at PSP, described the
shift in thinking related to this, saying that: ‘there was a growing realization that pension capitalism
was actually social capitalism, […] and so early questions about stewardship and governance
became questions about how to create a better world for pension plan members.’
Despite such shifts in thinking, integration of ESG-related considerations into pensions
fund management has made slow progress, encouraged by several national and international
developments. The 2008 financial crisis, for example, gave rise to concerns about the stability of
the financial market. In addition, platforms such as the United Nations (UN) Global Compact in
2000 and the UN Principles of Responsible Investing (PRI) in 2006 generated new pressure
encouraging ESG considerations. In some jurisdictions, increasing stakeholder pressure also
played a crucial role. In the UK, for example, several social movements accelerated the
conversation around ESG in the late 1990s, where organizations such as Ethics for USS 5
specifically targeted pension funds to include environmental and social considerations into their
investment decisions. As a response, USS adopted a sustainable investment policy in 1999.
Due to different historical experiences, pension regulation has evolved very differently in
the three markets studied. In the US, the Employee Retirement Investment Security Act (ERISA)
is cited as a challenge for pension funds seeking to integrate ESG factors, particularly in DC plans,
as it gives little to no guidance on how this can be done (Fabian et al. 2021). To address this, a bill
to amend ERISA was introduced by the Democrats in the Senate and House in May 2021, seeking
to require that plans would have to consider ESG factors in a prudent manner consistent with their
fiduciary duties (US Senate 2021). In the UK, the 2006 UK Corporate Governance Code and the
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2021 UK Stewardship Code underscored the linkage of fiduciary duty and ESG as long-term risk
factors. Additionally, since 2019, legislative measures from the UK Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA) require pension trustees to set out in their investment policies how they include ESG
considerations in investment decisions (Webb and Brown 2019). Finally, in Canada, according to
Section 78(3) of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act, Province of Ontario-governed pension plans
are required since 2016 to state ‘whether environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors are
incorporated into the plan’s investment policies and procedures, and if so, how they have been
incorporated.’ As of now, only Ontario-governed pension plans and a few public sector pension
plans have equivalent obligations. The Canadian regulatory authorities have not yet adopted the
equivalent of a Canadian Stewardship Code for investment fiduciaries, but the Canadian Coalition
for Good Governance, 6 an important voice on governance matters in Canada, published in 2017
seven stewardship principles which align with similar codes or principles in other countries, while
reflecting on the unique nature of Canada's capital markets. These principles, supported by many
large institutional investors, were intended to help institutions investing in Canadian public
equities be active and effective stewards of their investments
How pension plans can and want to consider ESG in investment decisions is highly
dependent on the interpretation of fiduciary duty, both by the regulator and by the financial
institution itself, a conclusion which regulates the relationship of a fund with its key stakeholders
(Clark 2004; Clark and Monk 2011). Because pensions have a delegated authority to watch over
their beneficiaries’ retirement income with an intergenerational mandate, their fiduciary duty and
legal constraints differ from other institutional investors. Yet while the concept of pension manager
fiduciary duty is grounded in a relatively stable set of legal principles, the interpretation of
fiduciary principles can be quite dynamic, evolving with ‘societal expectations’ in the past (Wood
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2011). Recently, for example, the Canadian Business Corporations Act (CBCA)-Section 122 (1.1)
was amended to codify the longstanding common law principle that directors and officers of
CBCA corporations are not required to consider only the interests of shareholders when acting in
the best interest of the corporation. Instead, they may also consider, among other factors, the
interests of employees, the environment, and the long-term interests of the corporation. Hawley
et al. (2011) stresses the need to rethink the concept of fiduciary duty.
To more closely link intergenerational timeframes of pension fund mandates with the
interpretation of fiduciary duty, some contend that ‘pension sector leaders should have a legal
obligation to look beyond tomorrow, and to focus the capital at their disposal at the long term’
(Ambachtsheer 2014: 9). Richardson and Peihani add that this can ‘create leverage to require
trustees to be considerate of the needs of future pension plan retirees, decades from now, who may
be impacted by changing economic and environmental conditions’ (2015: 450). Yet where an
expanded legal definition of fiduciary duty already exists, as is true for some, not all, types of
pensions in common-law countries, implementation is usually unmonitored and unaudited, often
without impact on investment decisions (Quigley 2019a).
The organizational level of pension funds is embedded in and shaped by the regulatory
environment, as described above. Ultimately, the regulatory environment decides on the level of
ambition that a pension fund can have when integrating ESG. We find that the regulatory
environment of pensions is not always a supporting factor for the integration of ESG, and that
pensions confront strict and narrow mandates, which often make it difficult for them to incorporate
factors other than those of a financial nature. Leadership and corporate governance, the investment
policy of a fund, and fund manager willingness to advocate and collaborate are therefore key
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factors at the organizational level that determine a pension fund’s ability to incorporate ESG into
investment decisions. The following section discusses this in more detail.
Corporate governance and leadership. Within the given mandate and legal structure of a pension
fund, the corporate governance of a plan and its leadership can be vital catalysts for the adoption
of sustainable investment strategies. While some legal mandates give pension boards and
leadership very strict boundaries where they cannot purse ESG policies, others give them more
freedom and/or impose certain responsibilities. Where the legal environment gives no clear
guidance, proactive leadership from pension boards and executives can push and enable a
sustainable investment agenda and strategy. In other instances, as in the UK, pension trustees
cannot legally provide opinions or advice on a fund’s investment strategy. Still, their guidance and
standpoint on long-term risk and sustainable development can help catalyze the right decision
within a fund.
At an organizational level, pension funds still face the inherent challenge of having a longterm commitment towards their members, while facing public and sponsor expectations of
generating short-term returns. This tension requires a thoughtful investment policy, strategy, and
a clear interpretation of fiduciary duty at the organizational level.
Investment policy. Pension funds are increasingly publishing investment policies referring to ESG
as one of many material factors. While this is mandatory in jurisdictions like the UK, this practice
is also found in the US and Canadian pension markets. The Global Stewardship Principles from
the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN 2016) and guidance from the UN PRI
(PRI 2021) have clearly made it easier for firms to issue statements of investment policies and
beliefs. While there are concerns about greenwashing and ‘box-ticking’ in instances of mandatory
inclusion of ESG in policies (Webb and Brown 2019), these documents can provide a good
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opportunity for boards and/or trustees to demonstrate that they are taking ESG risks and
opportunities seriously.
According to the PRI, ‘responsible investment can be integrated into investment policies
in many ways, including high-level public statements, codes of business practice, a standalone
responsible investment policy or by embedding responsible investment considerations into an
organization’s main investment policy’ (2021: 2). A sustainable investing policy or strategy
therefore need not start with an ambitious zero-carbon commitment, but instead it can start with
simply signaling awareness and willingness to being a responsible steward of capital. In this way,
ESG is becoming increasingly relevant for the purposeful use of voting rights, influencing
company strategy to ensure that pay is aligned, that there is quality disclosure (e.g., by supporting
standard-setting), and that advocating for legislation enables long-term investing. The importance
of policies also ties to our previous discussion of definitions of success regarding the use of ESG
in investment decisions. Ideally, an organization’s responsible investment policy defines what this
success looks like within a given legal structure.
Collaboration and Advocacy. The notion of investor stewardship, as outlined for example by the
ICGN, highlights the importance of investor collaboration to enhance the outcome of stewardship
activities, such as engagement with companies (ICGN 2016). The decision as to whether a pension
fund is willing to collaborate with other institutional investors and, indeed, whether it will advocate
for sustainability topics through lobbying or endorsement activities, must be made at an
organizational level and depend on the openness and interest of a fund’s leadership in ESG.
Indeed, pension funds are no stranger to collaborations with other market participants. Via
global forums such as the Net Zero Asset Owner Alliance, to more local groups such as the Maple
8, pension funds can increasingly communicate, share best practices, and collaborate with their.
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Yet due to their limited resources, not every pension fund can get involved in every collaboration
or lobby for every relevant piece of legislation. Nevertheless, carefully chosen collaboration can
actually increase efficiency, and well-placed advocacy can have spillovers.
On the advocacy side, public sector pension funds can collaborate with policy makers as
well. The Maple 8, for example, met with the Canadian security regulators to engage on proxy
voting. Furthermore, pension funds may support frameworks or organizations that they see as
useful for advancing sustainable finance practices on a global level. CalPERS, for example, has
taken a public stand to support various initiatives of sustainability disclosure standardization such
as the IFRS consultation and the consultation on the foundation of the Value Reporting Foundation
(CalPERS 2020). In 2021, as another example, ten Canadian pension funds recently offered public
comments on the SEC Climate Change Disclosure Consultation (SEC 2021).
The portfolio level. Under the assumption that interpretation and guidance from board and
leadership allow for considerations of sustainable finance, we next turn to several factors important
for ESG integration at the portfolio level.
Investment strategy and asset mix. Pension funds are usually highly diversified funds that invest
in public market bonds and equities, and increasingly, they make substantial allocations to private
equity, real estate, and infrastructure investments. A 2020 study from Mercer showed that, on
average, European pension funds had invested 22 percent in public equity, 47 percent in growth
fixed income, 53 percent in real assets, and 14 percent in private equity. The same survey found
that in 2020, 88 percent of these funds had considered integrating ESG into their investment policy,
up 20 percent from the year before. ESG integration in multiple asset classes is therefore a current
challenge for pension funds and their managers.
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ESG integration in investment has its origins in the public equity markets (Eccles and
Stroehle 2019), yet these discussions have increasingly become relevant in the fixed income and
private equity markets as well (Schroders 2020). Integrating ESG considerations into these
different asset classes, however, requires different approaches and a deep understanding of how
each of these markets work. For example, the need to move with agility varies by investment. In
public markets, for instance, investments tend to be liquid and stewardship tools, such as voting
and engagement, permit investors to try to influence a company’s direction (at least to some
extent). Investors in public companies can generally react by selling their stock if, for example,
concerns about long-term value or sustainability risks emerge. Of course this is only true if the
stock is not held in an index or index replication strategy.
In private markets, by contrast, and particularly in private equity, investments tend to be
less liquid. Accordingly, pension funds must carefully assess the risk and long-term strategy of
each holding. ESG considerations in private investments can therefore be useful when assessing
private assets and the need for continuous stewardship. Moreover, many investors have
traditionally held private equity for their high financial returns, with ESG not being a priority, but
this is starting to change significantly (Zaccone and Pedrini 2020). Additionally, General Partners
managing private equity funds are gradually integrating ESG into their investment and asset
management decision-making; some have even launched ‘impact funds,’ which focus specifically
on the creation of positive social impact, though these are still niche products.
In fixed income investments, ESG can inform a negative or positive screening of the
investment universe, or flow into the fundamental analysis of an issuer. In this regard, ESG
integration into fixed income can resemble the public equity side. Nevertheless, ESG in fixed
income is meant to inform about a potential credit risk. Accordingly, the issues important for a
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fixed income analyst may be very different that those that are important to shareholders (CFA
2019). So while an investor may choose to divest from a company on the public equity side (for
example, due to an ESG scandal), there may be incentives to simultaneously buy the bonds of the
very same company. This highlights how tradeoffs between financial and ESG considerations are
structured differently in different asset classes.
Relationships with Asset Managers. Pension funds have the choice either to manage their assets
in-house, or to hire asset managers to manage their assets externally. Either way, the balance is
struck between cost and return, where the higher cost of an outside manager is anticipated to be
offset by a higher expected investment return. Most recently, the trend towards external managers
has stalled. In the US, for example, larger state and public pension funds have returned to managing
at least part of their assets in-house (Aubry and Wandrei 2020), often driven by concerns about
the fees of these managers and related after-fee returns. If assets are internally managed, the
pension fund can, within its mandate, have full discretion over ESG integration. When assets are
externally managed, the UN Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) suggest that pension funds
integrate their sustainable investment priorities into manager selection, appointment, and
monitoring (PRI 2013).
The choice of internal versus external management in different asset classes will impact
how much direct influence a pension fund can have over how ESG is integrated into investment
decisions. Pension funds can outsource everything from portfolio construction, investment
decisions, to engagement with holding companies and proxy voting. The selection of an asset
manager for these activities is therefore important from an ESG perspective. An early alignment
on ESG priorities and expectations about transparency, reporting engagement and, when
applicable, voting, are key to ensuring that ESG is taken into consideration in a way that fits with
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the pension fund’s investment policy. ESG factors can then also be integrated into the asset
manager monitoring process, which catalyzes ongoing conversations and reviews. Furthermore,
while pension funds are explicit long-term owners and increasingly formulate expectations for
long-term risk management, including ESG, their mandates to and reviews of asset managers can
in fact be quite short term. Accordingly, longer-term mandates and performance reviews are
needed to enable external managers to effectively manage the ESG priorities of their clients.
Finally, in private equity, pension funds can sometimes have only a limited effect on their
managers. Currently private equity funds are often oversubscribed, so General Partners (GPs) can
often pick and choose the clients with whom they wish to work. This inhibits ESG conversations,
as it reduces the ability of Limited Partners (LPs) such as the pensions buying into a private equity
fund to negotiate disclosure requirements around new practices such as ESG. To this end, the
International Limited Partner Association represents one forum where a coordinated pension fund
voice can help establish a process for the whole private equity industry. If every pension fund were
to require the same standard disclosure from GPs, it could very likely be a ‘game changer,’ much
more so than sporadic and uncoordinated LP requests. Additional groups such as the UK Pension
Coalition for Inclusive Capitalism and the International Corporate Governance Network have
called for standard contract formats for public external managers.
Stewardship activities. Finally, pension funds can use active ownership and engagement activities
to exert their influence and to maximize both financial and ESG value. Stewardship and ESG
integration can be linked and complementary activities integral to responsible investing (PRI
2021). According to the ICGN, stewardship is ‘the responsible management of something
entrusted to one’s care. This suggests a fiduciary duty of care on the part of those agents (…) acting
on behalf of beneficiaries, who are often long-term savers or members of pension funds’ (ICGN
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2016: 4). Stewardship is meant to promote high standards of corporate governance, to preserve
and enhance long-term value, and to enhance systemic market stability.
Engagement—which is one tool used for stewardship—can enhance investment decisions,
communicate concerns, and foster relationships and constructive conversations with companies
about their ESG strategies. Eccles et al. (2021) outlined several strategies of engagement to be
used for ESG interactions with issuers and holdings. Some are top-down, including conservative
and opportunist engagements. Here ESG scores and topical lenses are used to screen the entire
portfolio and engage laggards and leaders. Bottom-up strategies focus more on long-term,
constructivist interactions that build relationships between the pension fund and companies.
Alternatively, activist strategies can be used to address topics perceived as critical and neglected
(Eccles et al 2021). Overall, stewardship and engagement allow pensions to take ESG positions
and actions.

A Case Study: PSP Investments
To add depth to our analysis, we undertook an in-depth case study of PSP Investments in
Canada, analyzing just how the fund’s historical origins and organizational characteristics link to
its understanding of ESG and its responsible investment strategy. PSP Investments is one of
Canada’s largest pension investment managers: it is a Canadian Crown corporation that invests
DB pension plan assets for the federal public service, the Canadian Forces, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police and the Reserve Force (the ‘Pension Plans’). As of March 31 2020, PSP
Investments had C$169.8B assets under management.
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History and legal context of PSP Investments. PSP has a unique mandate and a governance
structure tailored to that mandate. To understand and appreciate PSP’s unique governance
framework, it is important to consider the historical context that led to the creation of PSP in 1999.
In the 1980s, the Auditor General of Canada released a series of reports on the finance and
accounting practices associated with the various federal superannuation (pension) plans. Among
the Auditor General’s recommendations was a proposal to have the funds for federal employees
gradually invested in marketable securities, in order to provide a sound financial basis for future
benefits. In the mid-1990s, Canada undertook an important pension reform. The key driver for
pension reform was concern surrounding the long-term financial sustainability of public pension
plans in the face of the important expected pension payouts associated with an aging population
and retiree longevity. These payouts were predicted to rise higher than could be financed on the
basis of the ‘Pay-As-You-Go’ model. PSP was therefore created in 1999 by an Act of Parliament
(the Public Sector Pension Investment Board Act) to invest the net contributions received from the
Government from April 2000. Initially this reform covered the Canadian Forces, the Public
Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police DB pension plans; since March 1, 2007, it
included the Reserve Force DB pension plan. PSP was given a clear statutory mandate and has
operated at arms’ length from the Government of Canada.
Mandate and nature of PSP Investments. PSP’s mandate is to manage the pension funds
transferred to it by the Government of Canada in the best interest of the contributors and
beneficiaries, and to maximize investment returns without undue risk of loss, having regard to the
funding, policies, and requirements of the Pension Plans. The Government of Canada manages
and administers the Pension Plans, and PSP is the exclusive provider of investment management
services to the Pension Plans. The rationale for creating the PSP was to help sustain the Pension

19
Plans by investing the amounts contributed in a professionally-managed diversified portfolio of
capital market investments.
Review of the nature of the arm’s length relationship. PSP’s business and activities are
managed and supervised by a board of Directors (the ‘Board of Directors’) appointed by the
Government. In managing and supervising PSP, the Board of Directors does not receive directives,
mandate letters, or follow other instructions from the Government. Indeed, the Board of Directors
alone establishes the PSP’s investment policies, standards, and procedures, although in doing so,
the Board of Directors is required to have regard to the funding, policies, and requirements of the
Pension Plans and their ability to meet their financial obligations. This is a factor differentiating
PSP’s governance, compared to certain peers whose Directors are not involved in the setting of
investment policies nor do they have approval authority over investment decisions.
Investment approach. In keeping with PSP’s legislative mandate, the Board of Directors annually
approves the Policy Portfolio, which represents the long-term target asset allocation among broad
asset classes. In addition to allocations to publicly traded equities and fixed income, PSP’s Policy
Portfolio includes an important allocation to private asset classes such as real estate, private equity,
infrastructure, natural resources and credit investments. PSP is invested in both active and passive
investment strategies managed in-house as well as by external managers and fund managers. PSP’s
portfolio diversified in terms of asset classes, and also in terms of geography, making PSP a true
universal owner.
Responsible Investment at PSP Investments
ESG Governance at PSP Investments. In 2018, the sponsors of the Pension Plans adopted a
Funding Policy stating an expectation that PSP would report in its Statement of Investment Policy
Standards and Procedures, as well as other publicly available documents, how ESG factors are
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incorporated into its investment practices (PSP 2020). It was the first time since PSP’s inception
that PSP was provided with an expectation on ESG matters from the Pension Plans sponsors.
Nevertheless, PSP did not wait until 2018 to start its ESG journey. Rather, its first Social and
Environmental Responsibility Policy—now known as the Responsible Investment Policy (PSP
2020)—was adopted in 2001, and it has been regularly reviewed since then to adapt to a changing
world and reflect its current practices. The earliest version of the policy read:
‘In carrying out this duty [to discharge PSP Investments’ investment mandate],
the board of directors recognizes that a broad range of factors may be relevant
in assessing whether particular investments may properly be expected to
contribute to or be detrimental to PSP Investments’ ability to achieve its objects
and perform its duties. Among other things, the environmental and social
impact of the behaviour of corporations and entities in which PSP Investments
may invest may be one of a number of relevant factors that our investment
professionals would wish to take into account in making investment decisions
for the [Pension] Plans.
(…)
To assist it in assessing the factors that guide and inform its investment
decisions, PSP Investments encourages corporations and other entities in which
it may invest to disclose regularly to their investors and potential investors the
details of all policies, practices and matters that may be material to shareholder
value. It is our view that reasonable and timely disclosure should be made by
the corporations and entities in which we invest of their positions on all matters
that may materially affect shareholder value. Where social and environmental
issues are relevant and material, we would expect that they be included in that
disclosure. All shareholders have a right to know about the activities of the
corporations and entities whose securities they hold that are pertinent to the
value of their investments.’ (PSP 2001: 1)
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The direction set by the Board of Directors in 2001 was anchored in the belief that environmental
and social matters were relevant to investment decisions, especially when they could affect PSP’s
ability to provide for the financial benefit of the contributors to the Pension Plans and the Pension
Plans’ ability to honor the pension promises made to their contributors. This belief was not
imposed by pension plan sponsors or by regulation. Instead, it was shaped through dialogue and
several discussions between the board and senior management regarding the success factors for a
long-term investor. This underscores how leadership and governance have been key facilitators of
ESG integration at PSP. On this foundation, ESG developed from a risk management tool in 2001,
to what is now an integrated investment decision factor.
Other ESG enablers and inhibitors. It is useful to note that the lack of ESG-related regulations in
Canada either requiring the adoption of specific ESG practices or prohibiting ESG integration
qualifies as an enabler of ESG policy. As opposed to a responsible investment approach being
imposed by a regulator, it allowed for the development of an approach aligned with PSP’s mandate,
its investment strategy, and its total fund perspective. This enabler helped in building a strong level
of conviction about ESG risks and opportunities within the organization.
Other key enablers of ESG implementation at PSP were related to the fund’s long-term
investment mandate and asset mix. For PSP moving into the ESG arena was seen as indispensable
when investing in less liquid investments such as private assets. Accordingly, PSP adopted an
ESG strategy early on which would ensure that ESG factors would be integrated in the investment
process, from both a risk and an opportunity lens.
The COVID-19 pandemic has now amplified the importance of ESG issues for investors
like PSP who seek greater transparency about how organizations are managing their ESG risks
and integrating them into their business strategy. PSP is committed to bridging the gap between
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an ESG qualitative narrative and quantitative factor-driven analysis. Furthermore, PSP seeks to
address this inhibitor by collaborating with peers, industry regulators, academia, and investee
companies. This is one of the reasons why PSP joined its voice with other Canadian pension plan
investment managers, calling on companies and investors to provide consistent and complete ESG
information to strengthen investment decision-making and better manage ESG risk exposures (PSP
2020). It was the first time that the CEOs of Canada’s eight leading pension plan investment
managers issued a statement, but not the first time that these organizations collaborated to more
effectively deploy resources and encourage ESG best practices.
PSP Investments’ ESG strategy. To take into account the world of tomorrow, PSP factors ESG
risks and opportunities into its investment processes—with a view to enhancing performance,
steering capital towards more attractive areas, and mitigating potential issues. As part of its
investment analysis and decision-making processes, PSP identifies material ESG risks and
opportunities that could impact its investments long-term financial performance. PSP also
leverages its ownership positions to promote good governance practices, by exercising its proxy
voting rights and actively engaging with boards and management of investee companies on
material ESG risks and opportunities. When PSP allocates a portion of its capital to externallymanaged mandates and fund investments in public and private market portfolios, it engages
regularly with its external partners on ESG topics throughout the investment lifecycle. To ensure
that the ESG integration approach for each externally-managed mandate and fund investment is
consistent with its Responsible Investment Policy and expectations, PSP has developed an inhouse proprietary assessment framework that evaluates and ranks by quartile the overall external
managers’ and general partners’ ESG practices.

The quartile ranking helps the board by
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prioritizing engagement, sharing of best practices, and measuring progress of ESG integration in
investment decision-making and asset management over time.
Responsible investment at PSP is an active process that addresses ESG factors across all
asset classes. PSP’s investment teams evaluate ESG risks and opportunities in order to make more
informed investment decisions, by the dedicated Responsible Investment group housed in their
Chief Investment Officer group. This group works to oversee and implement responsible
investment activities across the total fund, provide guidance on ESG themes and trends, build
internal capacity through ESG knowledge sharing, and collaborate with industry peers to drive
systemic change on key ESG issues.

Conclusion
This paper has discussed the origins of ESG in pensions by reviewing the characteristics
of pension funds how they can integrate these ESG factors into investment decisions. Drawing on
existing literature, a range of interviews, and an in-depth study of PSP Investments, we showed
how different institutional, organizational and investment factors play a role. We identified three
levels for whether and how pension funds can integrate ESG: the institutional level, which sets the
historical and regulatory context of the interpretation of fiduciary duty; the organizational level,
which decides how investment mandates are translated into policies, governance structures, and
collaborations; and the portfolio level, which implements investment strategies through asset
allocation, the mandates to asset managers, and stewardship activities.
When reviewing these characteristics, we note that pension funds are not a homogenous
community. They have different mandates, legal environments, and governance structures to work
with. Despite this diversity, pension funds share a common objective, which is to identify the best
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investments or investment strategies to generate investment returns to be able to pay pensions to
their beneficiaries for generations to come. In so doing, the inherent long-term investment time
horizon and the diversified portfolio structures are often seen as the two of the principal ESG
enablers in pension funds, where the growing evidence about ESG materiality requires pension
funds to integrate them as risk factors in investment decision-making. How these factors will
ultimately be taken into consideration must depend on discretion of the pension fund, governance
structures, leadership, and the plan’s investment policy suitability for the fund’s asset mix. The
freedom of pension boards and leaders to do this, however, can be restricted through lack of clear
guidance on ESG expectations from plan sponsors or regulators. Additionally, regulators can
inhibit the integration of ESG by placing large reporting burdens on pension funds, therefore
making ESG an expensive use of resources.
Finally, pension funds have grown to be powerful forces in the investment market, and
they have an opportunity to further catalyze the market-wide integration of ESG factors. To do so,
they should focus not on what differentiates them, but rather what they have in common. All
pension funds have limited resources, yet collaboration and coordination can be key enablers for
them to speak with one voice, and to make that voice heard more loudly and persuasively. Possible
targets of such coordination, like disclosure standards and standard mandates for external
managers, can help facilitate a deeper integration of ESG in the entire investment chain.
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Endnote

1

See the discussion of the ‘Universal Ownership thesis’ in this regard, as, for example, outlined

in Quigley (2019a; 2019b), also discussed below.
2

The markets included in this study are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Finland, France,

Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, South Africa,
South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.
3

OECD Global Pensions Database, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=PNNI_NEW

4

This is calculated from the value of the US equity market (12/2020: $50.6 trillion USD), the

global equity market (12/2020: $95 trillion), and the equity-held percentage of pensions in the US
(32.7 percent of $32.2 trillion in 2019). In the UK, the sum is based on 11% of $3.6 trillion USD
EUM relative to $5 trillion USD, and in Canada on 21.8% of $2.8 trillion USD EUM relative to
$3.2 trillion USD. Data from Toronto Stock Exchange, OECD Pension Stats and Bloomberg
Finance.
5

Today part of the organization Share Action, see https://shareaction.org/uss/. Being a catalyst for

this type of activism, Ethics for USS also led to the creation of the ‘Fair Pensions’ organization in
collaboration with WWF, Amnesty International and Friends of the Earth in 2005.
6

Representing the interests of institutional investors, the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance

promotes good governance practices in Canadian public companies and the improvement of the
regulatory environment, to best align the interests of boards and management with those of their
shareholders, and to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the Canadian capital markets.
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Figure 1. The spectrum of choices for investors.

Source: Authors’ elaboration of Information and classification based on 1) UN PRI (2021a), and 2) GIIN (2021).
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Figure 2. Characteristics of pensions relevant for ESG

Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Note: This framework illustrates aspects of the institutional, organizational, and portfolio level, without a comprehensive representation of
activities at each level.
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